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Government Guarantees
in Infrastructure Projects:
A Second, Third Look
at the Policy
Introduction
Government guarantee has been used to encour-
age private sector participation in public infrastructure
projects. It is an instrument used to minimize, and in
some cases, eliminate the risks that discourage private
sector participation in financing, building, maintaining and
operating public infrastructure projects. For example, a
government credit guarantee can motivate private sector
lending for infrastructure projects by mitigating those risks
that the private sector cannot evaluate or will not bear.1
For the past six years, the Philippine government has
used government guarantees to encourage private sec-
tor participation in public infrastructure projects. A gov-
ernment guarantee is an important feature of the Build-
Operate-Transfer schemes that have helped solve the
country’s power crisis in the early part of the 1990s.
The provision of guarantee, however, is not without
cost to the government. It creates a contingent liability
which will require careful monitoring, accounting and pro-
visioning in the national government budget to meet fu-
ture guarantee calls. A contingent liability implies that
the payment of claims against the guarantee is condi-
tional on some future event.2 A guarantee claim for pay-
ment will translate into a payment burden on the part of
government and thus, from the fiscal management view-
point, the government must be adequately prepared to
meet those contingent liabilities when they become due.
This Policy Notes issue argues that the government
must move toward project financing structures which will
minimize the provision of direct and indirect subsidies,
guarantees and equity to infrastructure projects. Given
the accessibility of international capital markets arising
from the strong economic performance, continuing re-
form effort and increased confidence of the private sec-
tor to risk its capital in infrastructure projects, future
project financing structures must decrease government
exposure and increase private sector participation in
public infrastructure projects. This will require, among
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others, a greater private sector share of the risks of project
financing, putting the appropriate price on government
guarantees, programming the guarantee resources that
will be made available to those projects and allocating
them efficiently. Last, but not least, is the requirement
to monitor and have an adequate provisioning for the
contingent liabilities arising from the grant of government
guarantee.
This Notes has four parts. Section II briefly presents
the Philippine experience with government guarantees to
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects. Section III points
out the fiscal implications of the government guarantees.
Section IV discusses risk-sharing with the private sector.
The last section draws attention to certain points which




Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) schemes. The govern-
ment sought to improve the regulatory and administra-
tive framework for implementing infrastructure projects.
Thus, in 1990, Congress enacted  Republic Act (RA) No.
6957 (later amended by RA No. 7718 in 1994), more
popularly known as the “BOT Law,” which allows the pri-
vate sector to finance, construct, maintain and operate
public infrastructure projects. The objectives were to mini-
mize the burden of infrastructure projects on the national
government budget, minimize external borrowing for in-
frastructure projects, and use the efficiency of the pri-
vate sector in delivering a public good. The BOT scheme
is a contractual arrangement between the government
and the private contractor which obligates the latter to
finance and construct an infrastructure project for the
government, and operate and maintain the facility for a
definite period of time. During this operating period, the
contractor can charge rent, user charges, and toll fees
to recover his investment outlay and generate a reason-
able return to investment. It is important to note that the
private sector brings not only financing for the project but
also cost efficiencies together with operating know-how
and technical advantage.4 Thus, the government used
the BOT schemes to address the power crisis and more
recently, to move other infrastructure such as the Manila
Skyway Project, EDSA MRT III and others, from the draw-
ing tables to the project implementation stage.
Private power generation. The government has
privatized power generation to provide greater efficiency
in the power sector after the government realized the
inadequacies of state provision of power and  the regula-
tory and clearance procedures in that sector. The first
successful project was the 200 megawatt (MW) Hopewell
Navotas I which began operation and was synchronized
with the National Power Corporation (NPC) grid in 1991.
BOT arrangements were extensively used by the Ramos
government to lick the power crisis, believing that private
sector participation was the best way to increase power
generation capacity in the shortest possible time. The
government and NPC launched a “fast track” program
with some 10 suppliers for additional power generation
capacity of about 1000 MW within 18 months. By the
end of 1993, the power crisis was history after the pri-
vate sector responded positively to its new-found role.
Between 1992 and mid-1994, the government and NPC
had about 24 more BOT arrangements.
Initially, the arrangements were done on a transac-
tion by transaction basis with individual project sponsors
because of the urgency of the situation and the lack of
experience with BOT schemes in the country. The result-
ant agreements were generally on a cost plus or a mini-
mum rate of return basis. However, as the economy re-
covered and private capital regained confidence in the
————————
3This section relates the Philippine experience with providing guar-
antee to BOT projects in the power sector. After the successful private
sector-government cooperation in the power sector projects, other infra-
structure projects followed suit.
4Private power projects were completed at lower costs and used  25%
to 30% less time than public projects. In Argentina, Chile, Malaysia and
Macau, private concessionaires of water supply projects have reduced un-
accounted water from 50% to 60% of the total to 15% to 25% and
staffing costs by 30% to 50% (Kohli 1995).3
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country, the more recent contracts have been awarded
on a competitive basis. As of 1994, more than 35 power
plants accounting for some 5,000 MW are either already
in production or under active development/construction
with a total cost of US$5 billion. Except for hydro and
geothermal power, all future power generation capacity
will be with the private sector.5 Table 1 shows the avail-
able information on the different power projects in the
Philippines and their comparative costs.
Because the power crisis was the single most im-
portant factor to economic recovery and growth in the
early 1990s, the government accepted the installation
Table 1. Cost of Private Power Projects
————————
5This paragraph draws on an unpublished World Bank document
on power development in the Philippines.
of “peak-load” power plants that provided the much
needed power but at a relatively higher cost to the con-
sumer. But after the power crisis eased up, the govern-
ment sought less expensive power projects.
The benchmark price for private power in Luzon is-
land grid has dropped steadily from US$0.085 per kilo-
watt hour (kwh) under the “fast track” power program to
less than US$0.05 per kwh in the more recent BOT ar-
rangements where contracts were awarded after com-
Project Name Contractor Type Capacity Fuel Year Est. Cost Cost
MW Operation US$ Mn US$/kW
Navotas GT 1-3 Hopewell Holding-HK BOT 210 Diesel 1991 41 195
Subic, Zambales Diesel I Enron Power Co. - USA ROL 108 Bunker 1993 135 1250
Navotas GT 4 Hopewell Energy Int.-HK BOT 100 Diesel 1993 40 400
Limay-Bataan CC GT “A” ABB/Marubeni/Kawasaki BTO 300 Diesel 1993 330 1100
Makban Binary Geothermal Ormat Inc.-USA BTO 15.73 Geothermal 1993 17 1049
Pinamucan, Batangas Diesel Enron Power Co.-Inc. BOT 105 Bunker 1993 120 1143
Calaca Batangas Barges Far East Levingston BOO 90 Bunker 1993 78 867
Limay, Bataan CC “B” ABB/Marubeni/Kawasaki BTO 300 Mix 1993 350 1167
Bataan EPZA Diesel Edison Global (HK) BOO 58 Bunker 1994 31 534
Cavite EPZA Diesel Magellan Utilities BOO 63 Bunker 1994 22 349
Bacman Geothermal Ormat Inc.-USA BTO 15.73 Geothermal 1994 17 1049
Malaya Skid-Mounted Diesel Pro-Tech OL 50 Bunker 1994 14 280
Eng’g. Island Barge Sabah Shipyard Sdn BHD BOO 100 Naphtha 1994 30 300
Bauang, La Union Diesel First Private Power-PHIL BOT 215 Bunker 1994 285 1326
Pagbilao, Quezon Coal I Hopewell Energy Int.-HK BOT 350 Coal 1995 491 1401
Pagbilao, Quezon Coal II Hopewell Energy Int.-HK BOT 350 Coal 1996 491 1401
Tongonan Leyte-Luzon PNOC-EDC/Private BOO/BOT 440 Geothermal 1997 486 1104
Sual Pangasinan Coal Hopewell Holdinh (HK) BOT 1000 Coal 1999 1100 1100
Toledo Cebu Coal Atlas Consolidated-PHIL ECA 55 Coal 1993 60 1091
Iligan Diesel I/II Alson/Tomen -PHIL/Japan BOT 98 Bunker 1993 60 612




petitive bids. Table 2 shows the prices and costs of inde-
pendent power producers (IPPs) for Base Load Genera-
tion. Those power plants in 1994 onward provide elec-
tricity at a lower cost than that provided by power plants
of the “fast track” period.
During the “fast track”period of installing more
power capacity through the BOT schemes, the indepen-
Table 2. Philippine Prices and Cost of IPPs
for Base Load Generation (in USc/kWh)
dent power producers required comprehensive govern-
ment guarantees. These covered sovereign, foreign ex-
change convertibility, market and credit risks. Compre-
hensive guarantee coverage was required because
government’s ability to finance and install in the short-
est possible time the much needed power generation
capability was inadequate and because the country had
very limited access to private risk capital. Thus, govern-
ment had no other choice but to provide all the required
guarantees, including guarantees for NPC’s obligations,
“take or pay” undertakings backed by a sovereign guar-
antee. Ideally, the government should have provided guar-
antees only to “fundamental” risks or those pertaining
to sovereign and political risks.
However, recent BOT projects indicate the country’s
progress in attaining an improved credit standing in the
international capital markets which has enabled govern-
ment to provide a less comprehensive risk coverage. This
is seen in BOT arrangements in toll road construction
and in urban mass transit system. Thus, the success of
the BOT arrangements has encouraged government to
pursue greater private-public sector collaboration in sev-
eral areas:
j privatization of the power sector which
will involve the sale of NPC’s generating assets
and the geothermal resources of the PNOC-EDC
in the future, including possible privatization of
transmission;
j deregulation of the energy sector which
was preceded by the 1994 privatization of Petron,
a government oil refining and distribution com-
pany;
j bidding out of water distribution and
sewerage operation;
j extending BOT arrangements into other
public utilities such as toll roads, rail transport
and developing Subic and Clark, former US mili-
tary bases, into important regional industrial
zones.
Tollways construction.6 The project was the con-
struction of a 25.5 kilometer toll road costing US$500
million connecting Metro Manila to the Calabarzon devel-
opment area in Cavite province. Through a bidding pro-
cess, the government awarded a 35-year BOT conces-
sion to a joint venture between a private sector consor-
————————
6Drawn from the speech of Secretary of Finance, Roberto de Ocampo,
in the High Level Conference on Frontiers of the Public-Private Interface
in East Asia’s Infrastructure, Jakarta, Indonesia, September 3, 1996.
Financial Prices Economic Costs
Average Sensitivity Average Sensitivity
   Range    Range
By Technology
Diesel 5.64 5.24- 7.66 5.34 4.95-7.23
Gas Turbines 9.01 8.93-13.05 6.15 6.10-9.85
Steam-Coal 6.19 5.69- 7.35 5.03 4.61-5.85
Comb’d Cycle 5.96 5.56- 6.27 5.35 4.65-6.05
By Commissioning
Period
1991-1993 6.87 5.24-13.05 5.91 5.22-9.85





tium and the government’s Public Estates Authority. The
government’s guarantee cover was limited to political and
sovereign risks, including right of way, force majeure dur-
ing construction and operation, and cost escalation aris-
ing from variations in design. A novel idea introduced
was the guarantee on the parametric adjustment of toll
rates. This means that government guarantees the pro-
ponents compensation for any shortfall in toll revenues
arising from the non-implementation of an agreed-upon
parametric adjustment of toll rates. While the government
took the tariff risks, all other commercial and market
risks, e.g., the volume of traffic that will actually use the
toll road, were absorbed by the private investors and lend-
ers.
Light railway system.7 This involves the construc-
tion of a 17-kilometer light railway system traversing
Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA). The US$650 mil-
lion project was awarded to the private sector on a 25-
year “build-lease-transfer” arrangement. The original plan
was to finance the project from commercial borrowing
from foreign capital markets with the government provid-
ing only fundamental guarantees. However, government,
through the Department of Transportation and Commu-
nication (DOTC) and the Department of Finance (DOF),
took the initiative of helping the private sector consor-
tium negotiate for lower financing costs with the senior
lenders of the projects. The government guaranteed the
lease payments of DOTC to the proponents with confir-
mation from DOF that the obligations carry the full faith
and credit of the Republic of the Philippines. With this
performance undertaking, the interest rate to investors
was brought down from 20 percent to 15 percent. The
project was also made more commercially attractive to
the private sector consortium by awarding them the right
to commercial development in the depot and stations for
which they would have to pay lease to the government.





Independent power project.8 For a proposed 1,200
MW independent power project, the government will pro-
vide cover for
j fundamental risks composed of political and sov-
ereign risks,
j foreign exchange convertibility risks, and
j project specific risks.
An innovation is the inclusion of provision for a “fade
away” or “sunset” of the guarantee cover for the last two
types of risks subject to the Philippines attaining invest-
ment grade status in the international capital markets.
The proponents have the option to retain the guarantees
by paying the corresponding guarantee fees. To arrive at
the private sector valuation of the guarantee cover,  the
government has asked proponents to submit bids “with”
and “without” guarantee cover.
Emerging framework for providing guarantees. The
Philippine experience shows how the nature and extent
of government guarantee evolves over time as the
economy strengthens and private sector profitability is
enhanced. From the full comprehensive guarantee cover
during the early days of the power crisis, the government
is now sharing the risks with the private sector. More
specifically, commercial and market risks that appropri-
ately belong to the private sector are no longer covered
by government guarantee. The government has also un-
bundled the risks it is willing to cover into three types of
risks:
j Fundamental risks consisting of sovereign and
political risks such as expropriation by government, na-
tionalization, changes in law and force majeure for which
the guarantee is given free.
j Foreign exchange convertibility risks for which
a corresponding guarantee fee will be paid. The guaran-
tee “fades away” once the country is rated investment
grade by international credit rating agencies for two con-
secutive years. An option to continue with the guarantee
is given provided the guarantee fees are paid.6
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j Project specific risks where the guarantee will
be limited to the senior lender and for the original term
of the loan excluding returns to equity  holders. Guaran-
tee is provided for right of way, peaceful (project) site
occupancy and other related concerns. The guarantees
are priced with a “fade away” provision based on the
rating of the corporation implementing the project but
with an option to extend the guarantee cover upon pay-
ment of the corresponding fees.
In the beginning of the private-public cooperation in
infrastructure projects, project approvals and provision
of government guarantees were undertaken without the
benefit of a clear statement of policy, legal and regula-
tory framework. The Philippine experience illustrates the
need to clarify this framework and the government’s com-
mitments, establish the payment process for guarantee
calls, and seek support arrangements from export credit
agencies.9  The enactment of the BOT Law and its subse-
quent amendment was a very critical input toward clarify-
ing objectives and delineating private-public sector respon-
sibilities.
With respect to the regulatory framework, the gov-
ernment is strengthening regulatory institutions through
long-term training. More importantly, to encourage effi-
ciencies and fair pricing, the government is pursuing
sectoral reforms and is putting in place rules and condi-
tions that foster competition. As earlier stated, the initial
BOT arrangements were done on a transaction by trans-
action basis without the benefit of open competition. As
the government gains experience in BOT arrangements
and the provision of required guarantees and as the
economy recovers, the stage has been set for competi-
tive bids in infrastructure projects. This will ensure trans-
parency and reduce transaction costs.10
It is important to introduce policy and institutional
reforms to various sectors, e.g., water, information tech-
nology, energy, to attract sustainable private investments.
The country’s power generation objectives were achieved
largely because of the government’s decision to deregu-
late power generation. The efficiencies brought about by
the reforms will enable the private investors and lenders
to bear the commercial risks (which they should bear in
the first place) and get a reasonable return on their in-
vestments. Financial sector reforms should continue in
order to encourage long-term risk capital in the financial
markets and innovative and better-priced financial prod-
ucts.11
Net Fiscal Impact
of Government Guarantee Exposure
This section presents the net fiscal impact as the
difference between the lower demand for public sector
resources because of the availability of private sector
resources and the stock of contingent liabilities created
by the government’s guarantee exposure. The BOT ar-
rangements have enabled the government to avoid new
indebtedness and an increase in public sector deficits
but the government guarantees provided to those BOT
infrastructure projects have also given rise to huge con-
tingent liabilities.
Available figures show that in 1992, investments in
BOT projects amounted to as much as P12.8 billion or
0.9 percent of GNP. In 1995, these investments rose to
P51.4 billion or 2.6 percent of GNP. These amounts would
have been borrowed by the government and they would
have increased interest rates on average by 2.1 percent-
age points and inflation by some 4 percentage points
————————
9OECD countries’ export credit agencies provide guarantees against
risk of nonrepayment to their national exporters or banks which lend to
overseas importers of goods and services. During the period 1983-91,
export credit agencies had US$53.1 billion worth of business with a ma-
turity period of 5 years or more. Of this, 60% were for infrastructure fi-
nance linked principally to the import of capital goods (1994 World De-
velopment Report).
10The government may have to provide an a priori announcement of
the form and level of government support arrangements and seek the best
market offer from proponents.
11See Lamberte and Llanto (1995) for a lengthy discussion of finan-
cial sector policy and institutional reforms.7
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between 1992 and 1995.12 The government provided
guarantees to the BOT projects. The estimated cumula-
tive guarantee payments to BOT operators amount to
US$89.4 billion over the period 1994 to 2019. Assum-
ing a 15 percent discount rate, the net present value of
the guarantees to BOT projects has been put at about
P208.3 billion or 10.6 percent of GNP in 1995.13 How-
ever, the government does not expect any widespread
call on the government’s guarantee in the near future.
Thus, assuming a guarantee call of 3.8 percent of out-
standing guarantee cover, the government is expected to
pay out some P4.4 billion in 1992 to P13.0 billion in
2000. Annually, the average is about 0.3 to 0.4 percent
of GNP. Notwithstanding the imperfections in the esti-
mates, the point the paper stresses is that guarantees
generate contingent liabilities which must be managed
well. Otherwise, the government will be exposed to huge
payment burdens once a guarantee call is triggered.
This brings us to a number of issues that the gov-
ernment must work on. They are: (a) accounting and moni-
toring of contingent liabilities, and (b) programming and
allocation of the government guarantee cover. The over-
all impression is that there is no comprehensive and de-
tailed accounting and monitoring system for contingent
liabilities. In addition, there is no programming and allo-
cation of government guarantee cover.
Governments do not usually account for contingent
liabilities because government budgets are typically main-
tained on a cash basis.14 A direct government loan is
actually recorded as an outflow but the government guar-
antee is not recorded because nothing has been spent
during the accounting period. The cost of the guarantee
is accounted for only when a default and the ensuing
guarantee payment occur. For fiscal prudence, there is
thus a need for a systematic accounting system of con-
tingent liabilities. Canada, the United States and other
countries have an accounting system for contingent li-
abilities. A systematic accounting, monitoring and report-
ing are important to serve as early warning to the gov-
ernment of potential guarantee calls and the amount of
government exposure. A good example of this practice is
the requirement under the U.S. Credit Reform Act of 1990
for the budget to reflect the outlays required to cover
loan guarantees. Each federal agency that administers
credit programs has five accounts: a credit program ac-
count, a financing account, a liquidating account, a non-
credit account and a receipts account. There are sepa-
rate financing account for loans and guarantees. In their
annual requests for budgets, agencies have to include
estimates of the subsidy costs for new loans and guar-
antees. If an agency exhausts its subsidy appropriations
in a given year, it cannot provide further credit assis-
tance in that year.
In addition, there is a need for programming and
allocation of the guarantee cover that the government
can at any one time afford to provide. Together with moni-
toring, the programming exercise will provide government
useful information on the value of contingent liabilities,
allowing it to determine how much guarantee ex ante can
be reasonably provided without unduly exposing the gov-
ernment to unmanageable liabilities. In this respect, there
is a need for a system to  rank or  prioritize access to the
government’s guarantee. At the moment, there is no in-
ternally consistent programming of guarantee resources,
much less provisioning for potential guarantee calls. In
the event of a call, the government must have the liquid-
ity to pay the claims of the affected party.
Sharing the Risks with the Private Sector
Public infrastructure projects carry various risks that
may discourage  private sector financing, construction or
operation. Unless the government assumes some or all
————————
12Gil Beltran, in a presentation of the impact of the BOT program on
the fiscal sector, Punta Baluarte, Batangas, September 8, 1996. The
assumed guarantee call of 3.8% is based on the actual 3.8% subsidy
ratio of 14 major nonfinancial GOCCs from 1985 to 1995.
13Mody and Patro (1996) criticize the use of net present value meth-
ods because it is not clear what  appropriate discount rate to use and also
because the value of the guarantee depends on parameters that change
over time.
14This paragraph is drawn from Mody and Patro (1996).8
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of the risks associated with the project, the economy will
tend to underprovide it. The underlying rationale of the
government’s absorption of risks in public infrastructure
projects is that the project’s social return exceeds its
private returns and that society will be better off having
the project than doing without it. Thus, a government
guarantee is given to project lenders and/or sponsors
to minimize the attendant risks of an infrastructure project
and thereby, encourage private sector participation.
A practical approach in dealing with this problem of
underprovision is to identify and break down the risks
associated with the infrastructure project into several
components and assign the component risks to the par-
ties that should absorb them. The key activities are
j the optimal assignment of risks to the parties
that should absorb them, and
j the minimization of the component risks through
efficient risk management.
To encourage private sector participation and per-
formance in public infrastructure projects, the govern-
ment and the private sector may agree on the assign-
ment of the component risks and the determination of
the extent of risk sharing. For instance, the government
can guarantee the debt exposure of private sector inves-
tors for a limited period of time.
The critical action to take then is to determine which
risks are transferable to the private sector and encour-
age greater private sector share of those risks. The de-
lineation and sharing of component risks are necessary
to prevent perverse incentives that lead to project mis-
management,15 and to avoid moral hazard problems such
as relaxing on project monitoring and concentrating on
fund diversion. By taking on the full extent of the risk of
defaults, the government may end up holding the prover-
bial empty bag as private lenders and sponsors take stra-
tegic action to capture rents at the expense of the gov-
ernment. The satisfactory allocation of risks between the
government and the private sector is essential to the
successful implementation of infrastructure projects.
Related to this is the need for an explicit exit strat-
egy for government guarantee to minimize the
government’s risk exposure and contingent liabilities aris-
ing from the provision of guarantees. For example, a con-
scious limitation of the time period or situation under
which a guarantee is operational should be considered.
This approach minimizes the government’s risk exposure
and induces government to more efficiently leverage its
guarantee cover for infrastructure projects.
The other side of the government’s guarantee ex-
posure is the substantial reduction in actual public sec-
tor resource requirements for public infrastructure
projects. Through the BOT scheme, private sector re-
sources are brought to bear on requirements of infra-
structure projects for financing, maintenance and opera-
tion. This relieves the government of the need to raise
substantial amounts of public monies for the infrastruc-
ture projects at hand and allows it to divert public re-
sources to other competing uses. With a relatively low
tax revenue effort, the loan markets seem to be the logi-
cal source of project finance but this may not be a fea-
sible option if it raises the borrowing costs in the economy.
The other option—printing money—is not attractive ei-
ther because of its potential for creating inflationary ex-
pectations.16
On balance, the government must compare the
impact of lower (present) demands for government re-
sources because of guaranteed BOT projects with the
stock of contingent liabilities created by the guarantee
————————
15Eichengreen (1995) observed that in the late nineteenth century,
speculators diverted public sector funds because government-guaranteed
loans to the railways were not monitored. Mody and Patro (1996) point
out that to create an incentive for continued project monitoring and to
filter out lenders who have little ability to manage risk, governments seek
to share risks with private lenders by guaranteeing less than the full amount
of the loan.
16The country can ill afford to neglect public infrastructure invest-
ments at this time. These fell from 5% of GDP between 1979 and 1983
to less than 2% in the latter part of the 1980s with disastrous impact on
the economy, among which is the power deficiency in the early 1990s.9
Policy Notes
No. 97-11
cover and the potential guarantee calls in the future. A
positive net fiscal impact augurs well for government while
a negative fiscal position should trigger a review and re-
orientation of the government’s guarantee policy.
Conclusion
The following conclusions may help inform public
policy on government guarantees:
e Importance of a clear and transparent policy
framework. The importance of a clear set of rules, a
fairly stable legal and regulatory system in attracting pri-
vate risk capital cannot be overemphasized. However,
there is a need for continuing reforms in the various sec-
tors, e.g., energy, information technology, water, etc. Ar-
eas for reform consist of  the removal of barriers to entry
and competition, public monopolies, and pricing policies,
among others. This includes financial sector reforms that
will encourage long-term private lending and innovative,
better-priced financial products. This also calls for a care-
ful review of the necessity of providing government guar-
antees in view of the huge stock of contingent liabilities
they create. From the policy perspective, government must
ask itself whether other avenues to stimulate greater
private sector participation have been considered before
granting guarantee cover.
e Strategic value of government guarantees. The
Philippine experience has shown the high value put by
the private sector proponents to government guarantees.
The power crisis was solved largely because of the
government’s policy of providing the private sector a
greater role in infrastructure projects and of ensuring
ample investment protection scheme by way of govern-
ment guarantees. Thus, the government has a policy tool
which it can use to its advantage but not before consid-
ering an optimal sharing of risk with the private sector
and appreciating the fiscal burden of contingent liabili-
ties.
ciples motivating the provision of Philippine government
guarantee. This approach minimizes moral hazard prob-
lems and reduces the contingent liabilities of government.
The situation has radically changed from that which forced
the government to provide comprehensive guarantee, in-
cluding market or commercial risks, to that where risks
would be shared with the private sector.
For example, in toll roads and rail transport, com-
mercial risks are either being shared, if not being fully
borne, by the private sector. In these projects, the gov-
ernment guarantees the implementation of parametric
adjustment in toll rates which means that the private pro-
ponent will be indemnified if the parametric adjustment
is prevented by political pressure or judicial pronounce-
ment.
Thus, the current policy thrust is to limit guarantee
cover to those that are appropriately under the responsi-
bility of government, namely:
j fundamental guarantees covering sovereign and
political risks,
j convertibility guarantees covering foreign ex-
change convertibility risks, and
j project-specific guarantees covering problem ar-
eas as right of way, tariff schedule, construction, opera-
tion and maintenance risks.
e Exit strategy for guarantees. Realizing that guar-
antees need not be permanent features of project financ-
ing structures, the government is now considering a “sun-
set” or “fade away” clause in guarantee agreements. For
example, a guarantee on foreign exchange convertibility
“fades away” once the country attains investment grade
rating in the international capital markets. Having the
economy on the path to sustainable growth which pro-
vides private investors higher and more predictable re-
turns to investments has certainly strengthened the ne-
gotiating stance of the government with private sector
lenders and sponsors.
e Appropriate pricing of government guarantees.
There is a need for an appropriate pricing of  guarantees.
e Unbundling and assignment of risks. Breaking
down risks into its components and assigning them to
the parties that should bear them are now basic prin-10
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For example, in a forthcoming bid for a major power
project, the bidders have been requested to provide bids
with and without the government’s guarantee to obtain a
benchmark on the private sector valuation of such guar-
antees. Pricing is important because the guarantee is
not a costless commodity. On the other hand, inappropri-
ate pricing enlarges the exposure of government to  con-
tingent liabilities which create potential payment burdens
once the guarantee call is triggered.
e Contingent liability accounting, monitoring,
programming and provisioning for the guarantee expo-
sure. The growth of contingent liabilities creates poten-
tial budgetary problems for the government. An appropri-
ate and explicit accounting and budgeting for contingent
liabilities must be undertaken by government. Clearly,
there is a need to account for the guarantees so far pro-
vided and the associated contingent liabilities, monitor
them, and undertake a programming exercise to impose
budgetary discipline over the allocation of guarantee
cover. Appropriate accounting, budgeting, programming
and monitoring will result to a more credible guarantee
policy, manageable fiscal position and continuing private
sector participation in infrastructure projects.
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